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Abstract 
Most explanations for the necessity of an independent central bank rely on the 
time-inconsistency model and therefore assume that governments are weak, foolish, or 
untruthful and tend to cheat people. The model in this paper indicates, however, that an 
independent central bank is not necessary because governments are weak or foolish. Central 
banks must be independent because governments are economic Leviathans. Only by severing 
the link between the political will of a Leviathan government and economic activities is 
inflation perfectly guaranteed not to accelerate. A truly independent central bank is necessary 
because it severs this link. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
     A great deal of emphasis has been placed on the necessity of an independent central bank. 
The reason given for this necessity is that there is a fundamental difference between 
governments and central banks − governments pursue both political and economic objectives 
while central banks generally pursue only economic objectives. For example, a government is 
responsible for the national defense while a central bank is not. If a central bank is not 
independent of a politically motivated government and government intervention is allowed, the 
central bank cannot optimize economic social welfare. This heterogeneity in objectives between 
the government and the central bank makes an independent central bank necessary. Hence, the 
essential reason for the necessity of independent central bank lies in the political objectives of 
government.  
     What kind of political objectives do governments pursue and how are these political 
objectives related to the development of inflation? Most studies on independent central banks 
have relied on the time-inconsistency model by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983) to answer these questions (e.g., Berger, de Haan, and Eijffinger, 2000; Rogoff, 
1985). Their explanation invokes two fundamental concepts: (1) if a government is pressured 
by interest groups to take an inflationary policy stance and intervene in a central bank’s 
decision-making, the central bank is unable to fully commit to its policies; and (2) if a central 
bank is unable to fully commit to its policies, it finds itself in a sub-optimal equilibrium. 
     These explanations do not seem to sufficiently explain a government’s action. What 
pressures would cause a government to take an inflationary policy stance? Even though the 
government’s political objectives are essential in explaining the necessity of independent central 
banks, no detailed mechanism of the inflationary political pressures is usually given. Also, is a 
government always so foolish that it obeys interest groups that represent only a part of its 
constituency? Why is a government so weak even though it wields great authority at will? Does 
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a government dare to take inflationary actions even if the majority of its constituency prefers 
low inflation and the government itself also desires low inflation? Is such behavior rational? In 
addition, why would people choose apparently untruthful and weak governments that are under 
control of small interest groups? Are people foolish? These questions appear quite reasonable 
and imply that the aforementioned explanations are not sufficient as the explanation for the 
necessity of an independent central bank. That is, these explanations require us to assume that 
governments are intrinsically so weak, foolish, or untruthful that they always tend to cheat 
people and that people are so foolish that they are always meekly cheated by governments. 
These assumptions are necessary because the time-inconsistency model needs them to generate 
high inflation. 1  However, explanations that require such consistently weak, foolish, or 
untruthful governments and people clearly do not seem persuasive.2   
     Many of these explanations also do not consider the interrelation between inflation and 
the constraints on government deficit financing. The importance of this relationship is stressed 
in the literature on the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), the basic idea of which goes back 
to Sargent and Wallace (1981).3 If a government’s deficit-financing behavior has an important 
impact on inflation, a government can affect the development of inflation not only through 
                                                          
1 This view has also been criticized for other reasons, including that it needs a series of negative and persistent 
supply-side shocks that works to increase the natural rate of unemployment. Hence, as Ireland (1999) and Taylor 
(2002) argue, it is hard to explain the Great Inflation in Europe and the United States by the same mechanism because 
the movement of the natural rate of unemployment differed between them. In addition, it is difficult to explain the 
sharp decline of inflation in the 1980s by a demographic change that usually proceeds gradually. Another difficulty 
with this view is that it predicts that unemployment leads inflation but unemployment usually lags inflation. Thus, 
this view is clearly at odds with the data. 
2 A related view on this issue is the union contract view. However, the basic reasoning in the union contract view is 
similar to the time inconsistency view in the sense that inflationary political pressures are the problem (see, e.g., 
Berger, de Haan, and Eijffinger, 2000).  
3 See the FTPL literature, for example, Leeper (1991), Sims (1994, 1998, 2001), Woodford (1995, 2001), and 
Cochrane (1998a, 1998b, 2000). 
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intervention with the central bank but more directly through its own decisions on deficit 
financing. In this case, the government’s deficit-financing behavior and its interactions with the 
central bank must be studied to determine whether an independent central bank is necessary.  
Without modeling the government’s deficit-financing process, any results may not necessarily 
be regarded as sufficiently persuasive.  
     The purpose of this paper is to examine the aforementioned problems and present an 
alternative explanation for the necessity of an independent central bank. In this paper, I 
construct a model that analyzes the necessity of an independent central bank by explicitly 
incorporating (1) the political motive of a government that is not weak, foolish, or untruthful, 
and (2) the deficit-financing process of the government. This model indicates that, even though 
a government is not weak, foolish, or untruthful, the possibility of high inflation remains. This 
result implies that, without an independent central bank, there is no guarantee that inflation will 
not accelerate.  
     The paper is organized as follows. In section II, I examine the nature of government and 
construct a model that assumes an economically Leviathan government. The model shows that 
inflation is an inevitable consequence of heterogeneity in time preference rates between the 
Leviathan government and the representative household. The model in section II is combined 
with a conventional inflation model in section III. This combined model indicates that the rate 
of inflation is determined not only by the target rate of inflation but by the time preference of a 
Leviathan government. In section IV, I argue that it is only by severing the link between the 
political will of a Leviathan government and economic activities that inflation is guaranteed not 
to accelerate, and a truly independent central bank clearly severs the link. I offer some 
concluding remarks in section V. 
 
II. A LEVIATHAN GOVERNMENT AND INFLATION 
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1. The government budget constraint 
     The budget constraint of a government in the model in this paper is 
tttttt SXGRBB −−+=& , 
where Bt is the accumulated nominal government bonds, Rt is the nominal interest rate for 
government bonds, Gt is nominal government expenditure, Xt is nominal tax revenue, and St is 
the nominal amount of seigniorage at time t. The tax is assumed to be lump sum. All variables 
are expressed in per capita terms. The government bonds are long-term, and the returns on the 
bonds, Rt, are realized only after the bonds are held during a unit period, say a year. Government 
bonds are redeemed in a unit period, and the government successively refinances the bonds by 
issuing new ones at each time. Rt is composed of the real interest rate rt and the expected change 
of the bonds’ price by inflation e tbπ ,  such that 
e
tbtt πrR ,+= . Let 
t
t
t p
Bb = , 
t
t
t p
Gg = , 
t
t
t p
Xx = , and 
t
t
t p
Ss = , where pt is the price level at time t. Let also 
t
t
t p
p
π
&=  be the 
inflation rate at time t. By dividing by pt, the budget constraint is transformed to  
ttttt
t
t sxgRb
p
B −−+=& , 
which is equivalent to  
( ) tttttttttttttt sxgπRbπbsxgRbb −−+−=−−−+=& . 
     Because the returns on government bonds are realized only after holding the bonds during 
a unit period, investors buy the bonds if ( )dsrπER t
t tstt ∫ + +≥ 1  at time t where tR  is the 
nominal interest rate for bonds bought at t. Hence, by arbitrage, ( )dsrπER t
t tstt ∫ + += 1  and 
t
t
t stt
rdsπER += ∫ +1  if rt is constant (i.e., if it is at steady state). This equation means that, 
during a sufficiently small period between t and t + dt, the government’s obligation to pay for 
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the bonds’ return in the future increases not by tπdt  but by dsπEdt
t
t st ∫ +1 . Because 
ttt
t
t stttttttt
BrdsπEBRBB ,
1
,,1, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +==− ∫ ++  where 1, +ttB is the value of bonds at time t + 1, 
which was issued at time t, then ttt
t
t sttt
BrdsπEB ,
1
, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ += ∫ +& . If πt is constant, then 
ttt
t
t sttt
BrdsπEB ,
1
, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ += ∫ +& ( ) tttttt BrπB ,, +=⇔ & , but if πt is not constant, they are not necessarily 
equivalent.4 
     Because bonds are redeemed in a unit period and successively refinanced, the bonds the 
government is holding at t are composed of bonds issued between t - 1 and t. Hence, under 
perfect foresight, the average nominal interest rate for the total government bonds at time t is the 
weighted sum of tR  such that =⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
= ∫ ∫− −
ds
dvB
B
RR
t
t t
t tv
ts
st 1
1 ,
,
t
t
t t
t tv
tss
s v
rds
dvB
B
dvπ +⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∫ ∫∫− −
+
1
1 ,
,1 . 
If the weights 
∫ −tt tv
ts
dvB
B
1 ,
,  between t - 1 and t are not so different from each other, then 
approximately t
t
t
s
s vt
rdsdvπR += ∫ ∫− +1 1 .5 The average nominal interest rate for the total 
government bonds, therefore, develops by t
t
t
s
s vt
rdsdvπR += ∫ ∫− +1 1 . Here, if approximately 
                                                          
4 ( ) tttttt BrπB ,, +=& has been used for many analyses because πt is usually assumed to be constant. 
5 More precisely, if πt is constant, then ttt
t
t
s
s vt
rπrdsdvπR +=+= ∫ ∫− +1 1  for any set of weights. If πt is 
increasing, then 
t
t
t
s
s vt
t
t t
t tv
tss
s vt
rdsdvπrds
dvB
B
dvπR +>+⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
= ∫ ∫∫ ∫∫ −
+
−
−
+
1
1
1
1 ,
,1  in general because if 
new bonds are issued at t only for refinancing the redeemed bonds, then ( ) 1,11, 1 −−−+= ttttt BRB . In addition, if πt 
is increasing, t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ >∫ ∫− +1 1 ; thus, ttttt ss vt rπrdsdvπR +>+> ∫ ∫− +1 1 . Nevertheless, if weights 
are nearly equal, then approximately t
t
t
s
s vt
rdsdvπR += ∫ ∫− +1 1 . 
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wt
t
t s
πdsπ +
+ =∫ 1  for some constant ( )10 ≤≤ ww  for any t (i.e., if dsπtt s∫ +1  is represented by 
wtπ +  for any t), then t
t
t
s
s vt
rdsdvπR += ∫ ∫− +1 1 twt wt s rdsπ += ∫ + +−1 ; thus, approximately eb,tπ  
indicates a total price change by inflation during a unit period. If tπ  is constant, then 
t
t
t
s
s v
e
tb πdsdvππ == ∫ ∫− +1 1, , but if tπ  is not constant, te tb ππ =,  does not necessarily hold. The 
equation t
e
tb ππ =,  is merely a special case of e tbπ , .  
 
2. An economically Leviathan government  
     A Leviathan government is assumed in the model in this paper.6 As is known well, there 
are two extremely different views regarding government’s behavior in the literature on political 
economy: the Leviathan view and the benevolent view (e.g., Downs, 1957; Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980; Alesina and Cukierman, 1990). In a Leviathan government, politicians have 
their own preferences in responding to policy issues. In a benevolent government, politicians 
desire to behave in accordance with the will of voters, which also ensures that they will be 
reelected. In the Leviathan view, a government prioritizes pursuing its political objectives 
whereas, in the benevolent view, a government maximizes the same economic utility as the 
representative household. Because the political motivation of a government is essential to the 
explanation of the necessity of an independent central bank, it is appropriate to assume a 
Leviathan rather than a benevolent government for the analysis of the necessity of an 
independent central bank.7 
                                                          
6 The most prominent reference to Leviathan governments is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
7 The time-inconsistency model implicitly assumes a benevolent government. Hence, unless a government is 
assumed to be weak, foolish, or untruthful, inflation cannot be accelerated by monetary policies. That is, if a 
benevolent government is not weak, foolish, or untruthful, the rate of inflation is perfectly kept at the target rate of 
inflation.  
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     From an economic point of view, a benevolent government maximizes the expected 
economic utility of the representative household but a Leviathan government does not. Unlike a 
benevolent government, a Leviathan government is therefore not managed by politically neutral 
bureaucrats who are obligated to mechanically maximize the expected economic utility of the 
representative household at any time and under any political party. It is instead managed by 
politicians who have strong political wills to achieve their own political objectives by all 
means.8 Hence, while the expenditure of a benevolent government is a tool used to maximize 
the economic utility of the representative household, the expenditure of a Leviathan government 
is a tool used to achieve the government’s policy objectives. For instance, if a Leviathan 
government considers national security to be the most important political issue, defense 
spending will increase greatly compared with the case in which a government sees defense as a 
low priority. If improvement of social welfare is the top priority, however, spending on social 
welfare will increase dramatically compared with the case in which a government sees social 
welfare as a low priority. 
     Is it possible, however, for a Leviathan government to hold office for a long period? It is 
possible if both economic and political points of view are considered. The majority of people 
will support a Leviathan government even though they know that the government does not 
necessarily pursue only the economic objectives of the representative household because people 
choose a government for both economic and political reasons. A government is generally 
chosen by the median of households under a proportional representation system, but the 
representative household usually presumed in the economics literature is basically the mean 
                                                          
8 The government behavior assumed in the FTPL reflects an aspect of a Leviathan government. Christiano and 
Fitzgerald (2000) argue that non-Ricardian policies correspond to the type of policies in which governments are 
viewed as selecting policies and committing themselves to those policies in advance of prices being determined in 
markets. 
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household.9 Therefore, the economically representative household is not usually identical to the 
politically representative household. In other words, the Leviathan government argued here is an 
economically Leviathan government that maximizes the political utility of people whereas the 
conventional economically benevolent government maximizes the economic utility of people.  
     The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of government expenditure, 
tax revenue, or related activities in the political utility function of government (e.g., Edwards 
and Keen, 1996). A Leviathan government derives political utility from expenditure for its 
political purposes. Hence, the larger the expenditure is, the happier the Leviathan government 
will be. On the other hand, the Leviathan government knows that raising tax rates will provoke 
people’s antipathy and reduce the probability of being reelected, which makes the government 
uncomfortable because it expects that it cannot expend money to achieve its purposes if it loses 
power. The Leviathan government may regard taxes as necessary costs to obtain freedom of 
expenditure for its own purposes. Expenditure and taxes in the political utility function of the 
government are analogous to consumption and labor hours in the economic utility function of 
the household. Consumption and labor hours are both control variables, and as such, the 
government’s expenditure and tax revenue are also control variables. As a whole, the political 
utility function of government can be expressed as ( )ttG x,gu .10 In addition, it can be assumed 
based on the previously mentioned arguments that 0>∂
∂
t
G
g
u  and 02
2
<∂
∂
t
G
g
u , and 0<∂
∂
t
G
x
u and 
                                                          
9 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs 1957). Also see the literature on the delay in reforms 
(e.g., Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; Alesina and Drazen 1991). 
10 It is possible to assume that governments are partially benevolent. In this case the utility function of a government 
can be assumed to be ( )ttttG l,c,x,gu , where tc is real consumption and tl  is the leisure hours of the 
representative household. However, if a lump-sum tax is imposed, the government’s policies do not affect 
steady-state consumption and leisure hours. In this case, the utility function can be assumed to be ( )ttG x,gu . 
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02
2
>∂
∂
t
G
x
u .11 A Leviathan government therefore maximizes the expected sum of these utilities 
discounted by its time preference rate. A Leviathan government pursues political objectives 
under the constraint of deficit financing. As a whole, an economically Leviathan government 
should maximize its expected political utility subject to the budget constraint. 
 
3. The model 
     The utility function, Gu , of an economically Leviathan government is a constant relative 
risk aversion utility function. The government’s rate of time preference is Gθ . The optimization 
problem of the government is  
( ) ( )dttθ,xguEMax GttG −∫∞ exp00  
subject to  
( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb −−+−=& . 
The government maximizes its expected political utility considering the behavior of the 
representative household that is reflected in Rt in its budget constraint.12 
     On the other hand, a representative household maximizes its expected economic utility 
( ) ( )dttθcuEMax PtP −∫∞ exp00 , 
where Pu  and Pθ  are the economic utility function and the rate of time preference of the 
                                                          
11 Some may argue that it is more likely that 0>∂
∂
t
G
x
u and 02
2
<∂
∂
t
G
x
u . However, the assumption used is not an 
important issue here because 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
,xgu
x
,xgux &  at steady state, as will be shown in solving the optimization 
problem later in the paper. Thus, the results are not affected by which assumption is used.  
12 The model can be used to analyze inflation (see Harashima 2004, 2005, 2006). 
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representative household, subject to the constraint  
( ) tttt gckfk −−=& , 
where ( )⋅f  is the production function, tk  is the real capital per capita, and tc  is the real 
consumption per capita.13 The constraint means that the output ( )tkf  is demanded for private 
consumption ct, private investment tk& , and government expenditure gt. Government 
expenditure gt is an exogenous variable for the representative household because the 
government is Leviathan. The representative household maximizes its expected economic utility 
considering the behavior of government reflected in gt in its budget constraint. It is assumed that 
0>′Pu  and 0<′′Pu , and the population is constant.  
     Note that the time preference rate of government Gθ  is not necessarily identical to the 
time preference rate of the representative household Pθ . This heterogeneity plays an important 
role later in this study. The rates of time preference are different because of the following: (1) a 
government is chosen from among many political parties from economic and political points of 
view whereas the time preference rate of the representative household is related only to 
economic activities; (2) a government is usually chosen by the median of households under a 
proportional representation system and the converged policy reflects the median voter—not the 
mean voter—while an economically representative household is basically the mean household;14 
(3) even though people want to choose a government that has the same time preference rate as 
the representative household, the rates may differ owing to errors in expectations (e.g., Alesina 
and Cukierman, 1990); and (4) current voters cannot bind the choices of future voters and, if 
current voters are aware of this possibility that they cannot bind future voters, they may vote 
                                                          
13 The constraint is equivalent to ( ) ( )ttttttttt πRbsxbckfk −+−−−−= && . 
14 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., also Downs 1957), and also see the literature on the delay in 
reforms (e.g., Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992; Alesina and Drazen 1991). 
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more myopically as compared with their own rates of impatience in private economic activities 
(e.g., Tabellini and Alesina, 1990). Hence, it seems that the rates of time preference of 
government and the representative household should usually be heterogeneous. It should be also 
noted, however, that even though the rates of time preference are heterogeneous, a Leviathan 
government behaves based only on its own time preference rate, without hesitation. 
 
4. A Leviathan government and inflation 
     The simultaneous optimization of both government and representative household yields 
clear-cut results. To begin with, the maximization problem of a Leviathan government is solved. 
Let Hamiltonian GH  be ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttttttG,GttGG sxgπRbλtθx,guH −−+−+−= exp , where tG,λ  
is a costate variable. The optimality conditions for the government’s problem described above 
are  
(1) ( ) ( ) tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
g
x,gu −=−∂
∂ exp ,  
(2) ( ) ( ) tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
x
x,gu =−∂
∂ exp ,     
(3) ( )tttG,tG, πRλλ −−=& ,   
(4) ( ) ttttttt sxgπRbb −−+−=& , and      
(5) 0lim =∞→ ttG,t bλ .       
Combining conditions (1), (2), and (3) yields the following equations:  
( )
( ) te tb,tttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
ππrπRθ
g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gug
−+=−=+
∂
∂
∂
∂
&2
2
 and 
( )
( ) te tb,tttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
ππrπRθ
x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gux
−+=−=+
∂
∂
∂
∂
− &
2
2
. 
Here, 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gug &  and 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gux &  at steady state such that 0=tg&  
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and 0=tx& ; thus, te tb,tG ππrθ −+= . Here, by the optimality conditions of the representative 
household’s maximization problem, ( ) Ptt θrkf ==′  at the steady state such that 0=tc& , 
0=tk& , and 0=tg& . Hence te tbPG ππθθ −+= ,  and thus 
(6) PGt
e
tb, θθππ −+=  
at steady state such that 0=tg& , 0=tx& , 0=tc& , and 0=tk& .15   
     Equation (6) is a natural consequence of simultaneous optimization by a Leviathan 
government and the representative household. If the rates of time preference are heterogeneous 
between the government and the representative household, then t
e
tb ππ ≠, . Some may find this 
surprising because it has been naturally conjectured that t
e
tb ππ =, . However, this conjecture is a 
simple misunderstanding because, as was explained above, approximately e tbπ ,  indicates a total 
price change by inflation during a unit period such that dsdvππ
t
t
s
s v
e
b,t ∫ ∫− += 1 1 . On the other 
hand, tπ  indicates the instantaneous rate of inflation at a point such that 
t
tht
h
t
t
t p
h
pp
p
p
π
−
==
+
→0lim& . Equation (6) therefore indicates that tπ  develops according to the 
integral equation PG
t
t
s
s vt
θθdsdvππ +−= ∫ ∫− +1 1 . The conjecture that te tb ππ =,  is true when tπ  
is constant. Because dsdvππ
t
t
s
s v
e
b,t ∫ ∫− += 1 1 , if tπ  is constant, then the equation te tb ππ =,  
holds. If tπ  is not constant, the equation t
e
tb ππ =,  does not necessarily hold. Equation (6) 
indicates that the equation t
e
tb ππ =,  holds only in the case where PG θθ =  (i.e., a 
homogeneous rate of time preference). The equation t
e
tb ππ =,  has generally not been 
                                                          
15 If and only if 
t
ttt
G b
sxg
θ
−−−=  at steady state, then the transversality condition (5) 0lim =∞→ ttG,t bλ  holds. 
The proof is shown in Appendix. 
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questioned probably because it has been thought that the homogeneous rate of time preference 
such that PG θθ =  naturally prevails. However, as argued above, a homogeneous rate of time 
preference is not usually guaranteed. 
     What does equation (6) (or the integral equation PG
t
t
s
s vt
θθdsdvππ +−= ∫ ∫− +1 1 ) indicate? It 
indicates that inflation accelerates or decelerates when the rates of time preference are 
heterogeneous. If tπ  is constant, the equation dsdvπππ
t
t
s
s v
e
tb,t ∫ ∫− +== 1 1  holds; conversely, if 
dsdvπππ
t
t
s
s v
e
tb,t ∫ ∫− +=≠ 1 1 , then tπ  is not constant. Without the acceleration or deceleration of 
inflation, therefore, equation (6) cannot hold in an economy with PG θθ ≠ . That is, inflation 
accelerates or decelerates as a result of the government and the representative household 
reconciling the contradiction in heterogeneous rates of time preference. 
     Here, if PGt
t
t v
θθπdvπ −=−∫ +1 , then ( )tθθππ PGt −+= 20 . Hence, ttt ss v πdsdvπ −∫ ∫− +1 1  
0≠−= PG θθ suggests that inflation accelerates or decelerates nonlinearly such that 
( ) tzPGt tθθyππ −+= 0  where y is a constant and zt is a variable. To be precise, for a sufficiently 
small period between 1+t  and dtt ++1 , dttπ ++1  is determined with sπ  ( )11 +≤<− tst  that 
satisfies t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ −∫ ∫− +1 1 PG θθ −= , so as to hold the equation =∫ ∫+ + dsdvπdttt ss v1  
tdtt
dtt
t
s
s v
ππdsdvπ −+ +
+−
−
+∫ ∫11 1 . Suppose that initially PG θθ =  but Gθ  changes at time 0 and 
Gθ  and Pθ  are not identical since then. Because πt is constant before 0=t , then 
=∫ ∫− + dsdvπtt ss v1 1 ( ) 001 10 0 πdsdvππs v +−∫ ∫− + . Here, for πt to be smooth at time t = 1,  it is 
assumed that ytππt += 0  for 10 <≤ t  (y is a constant). Thus ( )tθθππ PGt −+= 60  for 
10 <≤ t . After t = 1, πt gradually departs from the path of ( )tθθππ PGt −+= 60  upward if 
PG θθ >  and downward if PG θθ <  such that 
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(7) ( ) tzPGt tθθππ −+= 60  
where zt > 1, so as to hold t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ −∫ ∫− +1 1 PG θθ −= . However, around 1=t , 
approximately 
(8) ( )tθθππ PGt −+= 60  and 
(9) ( )PGt θθπ −= 6& . 
     Note that, inflation must be constant without PG θθ ≠ . It is not until being PG θθ ≠  that 
inflation can accelerate or decelerate. That is, PG θθ ≠  bends the path of inflation and makes it 
nonlinear, which enable inflation to accelerate or decelerate. The many episodes of inflation 
acceleration and disinflation across time and countries suggest that PG θθ ≠  is not rare. 
 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL BANK 
 
     Equation (7) clearly indicates that there is a possibility of high inflation with Leviathan 
governments because inflation accelerates if PG θθ > . Hence, if a central bank is not 
independent of a Leviathan government, there is no guarantee that inflation will not accelerate. 
Equation (7) therefore strongly implies an independent central bank is necessary to eliminate 
any possibility of high inflation. It is still not clear how a central bank behaves facing a 
Leviathan government, however; that is, how does a central bank manage the nominal interest 
rate considering equation (7) ? I examine this question in this section. 
 
1. A conventional model of inflation 
     First, I construct a conventional discrete-time inflation model with random shocks, in 
which only the central bank controls inflation. This type of inflation model is used for analyses 
of the short-term adjustment process of inflation deviations caused by random shocks and is 
based on the backward-looking Phillips curve type of model examined in Svensson (2003). It 
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consists of an aggregate supply function, an aggregate demand function, and a Taylor-type 
instrument rule for a central bank. 
The aggregate supply function (Phillips curve) is 
(10) 111 +++ +++= ttztxtt εzαxαππ , 
the aggregate demand function is 
(11) ( ) 111 +++ +−−+= ttrtztxt ηrrβzβxβx , 
and the Taylor-type instrument rule for the central bank is 
(12) ( ) tx*tπt xγππγγi +−+= , 
where πt is the rate of inflation; xt is the output gap; zt is a column vector of exogenous 
variables; rt is the real interest rate; r is the average real interest rate; it is the nominal interest 
rate; π* is the target rate of inflation; αx, βx, βr, γ , γπ, and γx are constant coefficients; αz and βz 
are row vectors of constant coefficients; εt and ηt are i.i.d. shocks with zero mean; and 00 =ε  
and 00 =η . Here, rπγ * +=  as is usually assumed, and the real interest rate is defined as 
follows:  
(13) |tttt πir 1+−≡ , 
where |ttπ 1+  is the rate of inflation that is expected in period t for period t + 1, and it is 
assumed that rr tst =+ |  for any s (s = 1,2,3,…).  
 
2. An extended model that incorporates the basic nature of a Leviathan government 
     I now extend the model to one that incorporates the Leviathan government’s role in 
inflation to analyze the effects of government on the short-term inflation adjustment processes.16 
The basic nature of a Leviathan government as shown in the previous section is that πt is a 
function of PG θθ −  and approximately ( )PGt θθπ −=6&  around t = 1; that is, ( )PGtt θθππ −+=+ 61  
                                                          
16 This extended model is based on Harashima (2005). 
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in a discrete time model. Here, the equation ttPt μrμθr +=+=  holds at equilibrium in 
markets with random shocks, where μt is i.i.d. shocks with zero mean and 00 =μ . Hence, the 
law of motion for inflation ( )PGtt θθππ −+=+ 61  can be rewritten as ( )tGtt μrθππ −−+=+ 61 . 
Thus, in a discrete-time model with random shocks, 
(14) ( )( ) 11
1
01 616 +
+
=
+ +−+−+= ∑ tt
v
vGt ξμtrθππ , 
where π0 is πt in period 0 and thus a steady state inflation rate before a shock on π*, and ξt is an 
i.i.d. shock with zero mean and 00 =ξ . The model here includes equation (14) in addition to 
equations (10), (11), (12), and (13).  
     The inclusion of equation (14) implies that either the target rate of inflation π* or the 
preference of government Gθ  is a time-variable endogenous variable. Either the central bank 
or the government affects the development of inflation. In many existing inflation models, the 
role of the government is not explicitly separated from the role of the central bank, and the 
relationship between them is left ambiguous. In contrast, the extended model here separates 
them clearly, thus allowing a much more lucid examination of how their relationship in the 
decision-making process of monetary policy affects the development of inflation.  
      
3. The inflation acceleration mechanism in the extended model 
     The extended model indicates the following important relation between the preferences of 
an economically Leviathan government and the central bank.  
Proposition: Approximately =− rGθ ( )[ ]( )0116 1 ππβt β *xx −+−
− . 
Proof: By equations (12) and (13), 
(15) ( )
π
t
π
x
|ttt
π
*
t γ
γx
γ
γ
πr
γ
ππ −−++= +11 , 
 17
and by equations (10) and (15), 
π
tx|ttztxtt*
t γ
xγγzαxαπr
ππ
−−++++= +1 . Thereby, 
(16) ( )[ ]|ttzt*πtπ
xx
t zαγrπγπγγα
x 11
1
+−+−−−−= .  
By equations (11) and (16), 
(17) ( ) =−+−−− ++++ 12111 |ttzt*πtπ zαγrπγπγ  
   ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]1111 +++ +−−−+−+−−− ttr|ttzxx|ttzt*πtπx ηrrβzβγαzαγrπγπγβ . 
By equation (14) and equation (17), 
   ( ) ( )( ) ( ) =−++−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+−+− ++++
+
=
∑ 12111
1
0 6161 |ttzt
*
πt
t
v
vGπ zαγμrπγξμtrθπγ  
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )111
0
0 661 +++
=
+−−+
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −+−−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−+− ∑ ttr|ttzxx|ttzt*πtt
v
vGπx ημβzβγαzαγμrπγξμtrθπγβ  
because ( ) tt
v
vGt ξμtrθππ +−−+= ∑
=0
0 66  by equation (14). Thereby, 
   ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]rβtβtγθtβtγ xxπGxπ −+−+−=−+− 1116116  
   ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 12111
1
0 6111 ++++
+
=
++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−+−−−−+ ∑ |ttzttt
v
vππ
*
πx zαμξμγπγγπγβ  
   ( ) ( )( )111
0
61 +++
=
+−−+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−− ∑ ttr|ttzxx|ttzttt
v
vπx ημβzβγαzαμξμγβ .  
Thus,  
   ( ) ( )[ ]( )( )tβtγ πγγπγrβrθ xπ π
*
πx
G −+−
−−−+−=−
116
11 0  
   
( ) ( )
( )( )tβtγ
zαμξμγβzαμξμγ
xπ
|ttztt
t
v
vπx|ttztt
t
v
vπ
−+−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−
+
+
=
++++
+
=
∑∑
116
6161 1
0
1211
1
1  
   
( )( )
( )( )tβtγ
ημβzβγα
xπ
ttr|ttzxx
−+−
+−−+ ++
116
11 . 
It is assumed for simplicity that the exogenous variables zt play limited roles for inflation and 
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output gaps; thus, αz and βz are near zero and approximately ( ) ( ) 01112 =−+− ++++ |ttzxx|ttx|ttz zβγαzβzα . 
Therefore,  
(18) ( ) ( )[ ]( )( )tβtγ πγγπγrβrθ xπ π
*
πx
G −+−
−−−+−=−
116
11 0  
   
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )tβtγ
ημβγαμξμγβμξμγ
xπ
ttrxxtt
t
v
vπxtt
t
v
vπ
−+−
−−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−
+
+
=
++
+
=
∑∑
116
6161 1
0
11
1
1 . 
Because it is assumed that ηt, μt, and ξt are i.i.d. shocks with zero mean, then by taking 
expectations of both sides of equation (18),  
=− rGθ ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]011116 1 πγγπγrβtγ β π*πxπ x −−−++−− − .17  
Because rπγ * += ,  
(19) =− rGθ ( )[ ]( )0116 1 ππβt β *xx −+−
− . 
                                                                     Q.E.D. 
     The important implication of proposition is that because ( )[ ] 0116
1 >+−
−
x
x
βt
β , then 
rG ≤θ  if 0ππ* ≤  and rG >θ  if 0ππ* > .18 By equation (14), if rG ≤θ , then inflation 
does not accelerate, but if rG >θ , then inflation accelerates. Hence, equation (19) determines 
the rate of inflation in the model. Unlike the conventional model, the rate of inflation is 
determined not only by the target rate of inflation π* but by the preference of government Gθ  
(i.e., by interactions between the government and the central bank). If 0ππ
* = , then 
                                                          
17 Note that either the target rate of inflation π* or the time preference rate of government θG is a time-variable 
endogenous variable. For instance, if the target rate of inflation π* is a time-variable endogenous variable, π* in 
equation (18) means π*t|0. 
18 Note again that either π* or θG is a time-variable endogenous variable. 
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PG r θθ ==  and inflation neither accelerates nor decelerates by equation (14). 
     If a central bank is not independent, the time preference rate of a Leviathan government is 
an exogenous variable whereas the target rate of inflation is an endogenous variable. That is, the 
central bank must set the target rate of inflation consistent with the time preference rate of the 
Leviathan government.  
Corollary: If rG >θ  and Gθ  is not changed, the target rate of inflation π* needs to be raised 
accordingly.  
Proof: By equation (19), =− rθG ( )[ ]( )0116 1lim ππβt β *xxt −+−
−
∞→ t
π *
t 6
lim∞→= ; thus, t
π *
t 6
lim∞→
= a 
positive constant. 
                                                                     Q.E.D. 
It has been reported that the target rate of inflation during the Great Inflation in the 1960s and 
the 1970s was high. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Favero and Rovelli (2001), and Dennis 
(2001) conclude that the target rate of inflation in the pre-Volker era was much higher than that 
in the Volker-Greenspan era. Setting a high inflation target is not a simple policy mistake, but it 
indicates that a central bank is deliberately committing the “crime” of high inflation. However, 
corollary implies that the central banks at the time were forced to raise the target rate of 
inflation because they were not independent of the politically motivated Leviathan governments. 
     The key mechanism for accelerating inflation lies in how people perceive Gθ  by 
observing monetary policy. People cannot directly observe the preference of government, but 
they can observe how the central bank manipulates the nominal interest rate. If people observe 
that the central bank sets an inflation target such that 0ππ
* > , they perceive that rθG >  and 
inflation accelerates by equation (14) and vice versa.  
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
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     Proposition implies that a conflict of interest emerges if a central bank is not independent 
and a Leviathan government sets the target rate of inflation. Because proposition indicates that 
the target rate of inflation cannot be set independently of the time preference rate of government, 
the target rate of inflation must be consistent with the time preference rate of government. That 
is, it must satisfy equation (19), given the time preference rate of government. However, there is 
no guarantee that the target rate of inflation determined based on the time preference rate of 
government is identical to the target rate of inflation that the representative household wishes 
because, as was argued previously, there is no guarantee that the rates of time preference of 
government and the representative household are identical. Hence, the government must choose 
whether to set the target rate of inflation subject to its own time preference rate or to change its 
time preference rate to set the target rate of inflation equal to that of the representative 
household.  
     This problem does not trouble a Leviathan government, however, because a Leviathan 
government has the will to achieve its own political objectives by all means and therefore will 
decide without hesitation that its own time preference rate should dominate. As a result, there is 
no guarantee that the target rate of inflation is set as the representative household wishes and 
that inflation does not accelerate. It is important to note that, in this context, the problem is not 
that the government is weak, foolish, or untruthful and that people are foolish but that the 
government is economically Leviathan. If a government is not Leviathan and merely maximizes 
the representative household’s economic welfare function mechanically, inflation will never 
accelerate. 
     How should this problem that there is no guarantee that inflation does not accelerate be 
solved? Clearly, the link between the political will of a Leviathan government and economic 
activities needs to be severed in the process of making monetary policy decisions. One practical 
way of severing the link is to give the authority to set the target rate of inflation to an 
independent central bank that is not influenced by the political environment. A Leviathan 
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government may not like this solution because part of its power is transferred to the independent 
central bank. Once the authority has been transferred to the independent central bank, the time 
preference rate of the Leviathan government must be changed to one that is consistent with the 
policy objectives of the independent central bank. That is, the time preference rate of the 
Leviathan government becomes an endogenous variable that is determined by the independent 
central bank through equation (19), whereas the target rate of inflation set by the independent 
central bank is an exogenous variable. If the Leviathan government does not obey the 
independent central bank, equation (19) does not hold and inflation does not develop as the 
Leviathan government wants. This means that the knife-edge condition (
t
ttt
G b
sxg
θ
−−−=  in 
Lemma 1) that the Leviathan government wishes to hold based on the presumption that inflation 
develops according to equation (7) cannot be held. Without changing its time preference rate, 
therefore, fiscal deficits are expected to explode eventually (i.e., transversality condition (5) 
does not hold). Even a Leviathan government will not choose this devastating scenario. It thus 
has no other way than to obey the independent central bank and change its time preference rate 
to the one that is consistent with the target rate of inflation that the independent central bank 
sets.19  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
      
     The model in this paper escapes the previously mentioned shortcomings of conventional 
                                                          
19 This solution may not be so bad from the Leviathan government’s point of view because only its rate of time 
preference is changed, and the government can still pursue its political objectives. One criticism of an independent 
central bank (e.g., Blinder, 1998) is that, since the time-inconsistency problem is more acute with fiscal policy, why 
aren’t fiscal policies delegated? A Leviathan government, however, will never allow fiscal policies to be delegated to 
an independent institution because the Leviathan government would then not be able to pursue its political objectives, 
which in a sense would mean the death of the Leviathan government. 
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explanations for the necessity of an independent central bank and makes an alternative 
explanation possible. The starting point of the alternative explanation is equation (6) or (7). 
These equations indicate that the acceleration and deceleration of inflation are inevitable 
consequences of reconciling the contradiction in heterogeneity in time preference rates between 
an economically Leviathan government and the representative household. The conjecture 
t
e
tb ππ =,  is true if tπ  is constant because PG θθ = , but it is not necessarily true if tπ  is not 
constant because PG θθ ≠ . Hence, even though a government is not weak, foolish, or untruthful, 
there is no guarantee that inflation will not accelerate. This result is obtained essentially because 
both people’s economic and political utilities are considered in the model. I do not argue that all 
governments are economically Leviathan. The many episodes of high inflation across time and 
countries suggest, however, that economically Leviathan governments are not rare.  
     Inflation accelerates because of the strong political will of an economically Leviathan 
government. Inflation is guaranteed not to accelerate only when the link between the political 
will of an economically Leviathan government and economic activities is effectively severed. A 
truly independent central bank severs the link and, for the first time, guarantees that inflation 
will not accelerate.  
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APPENDIX 
 
     By equation (6), t
e
tb ππ −, PGttt θθπrR −=−−=  at steady state. Hence, Gtt θπR =−  
because tP rθ = . Substituting the equation Gtt θπR =−  and equation (6) into conditions (3) 
and (4) and solving both differential equations yield the equation: 
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−−= ∫ #
t
tttttG, Cdtb
sxgbλ 1exp  at steady state where C# is a certain constant. Thereby it 
is necessary to satisfy 0<−− ttt sxg  and ∞=∫∞→ dtbtt
1lim  for the transversality condition 
(5) to be held. 
     Here, by condition (4), 
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b −−+=&  at steady state. Hence, if 
0=−−+=
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b&  at steady state, then tb  is constant; thus, ∞=∫∞→ dtbtt
1lim . Thereby, 
the transversality condition holds. However, if 0<−−+=
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b&  at steady state, then 
tb  diminishes to zero and transversality condition (5) cannot hold because 0<−− ttt sxg . 
If 0>−−+=
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
sxg
θ
b
b&  at steady state, then G
t
t
t
θ
b
b =
∞→
&
lim ; thus, tb  increases as time passes 
and ∫ =∞→
Gt
t θ
Cdt
b
##1lim , where C## is a certain constant. Thereby transversality condition (5) also 
cannot hold.                                                        ■ 
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